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Abstract 
Department of Defense (DoD) spending on services has been trending 
upwards for over a decade and, as of 2011, it accounted for 56% of total contract 
spending.  The increased reliance on services contractors has prompted the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to look more closely at the acquisition and 
contract management process.  In this research we address the following questions:  
(1) How do different stakeholders define successful services contracts within the 
Navy? (2) How do different stakeholders measure services contracts within the 
Navy? and (3) how should Navy services contracts be defined and measured?  We 
conducted a survey of 168 key stakeholders.  We discovered that when defining and 
measuring the success of a service contract all stakeholders tend to utilize outcome-
related factors over process-oriented factors.  We believe this is because outcomes 
tend to drive perceptions of success more than processes and are more easily 
quantifiable.  Metrics used to measure success are typically related to cost, 
schedule, and performance.  Based on these findings, we provide recommendations 
on establishing better internal control measures, putting in place an operational audit 
process, and creating a standardized reporting process. 
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I. Introduction 
The service sector represents the largest and the fastest growing segment of 
the economies of the U.S. and other developed countries. This growth of services in 
the overall economy is also mirrored by the growth of services acquisition in the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  For example, the DoD obligations on contracts have 
more than doubled between fiscal years 2001 and 2008 to over $387 billion, with 
over $200 billion spent just for services in 2008 (Government Accountability Office 
[GAO], 2009). In conjunction with this increase in defense procurement is the 
reduction of the defense acquisition workforce.  The size of the federal workforce 
decreased from 2.25 million in 1990 to 1.78 million in 2000 (GAO, 2002).  The 
combination of the increasing defense procurement workload and the decreasing 
size of the government workforce, along with the complexities of an arcane and 
convoluted government contracting process, have created the perfect storm—an 
environment in which complying with government contracting policies and adopting 
contract management best practices has not always been feasible (Rendon, 2010).  
Between 2001 and 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued 16 
reports related to trends, challenges, and deficiencies in defense contracting.  
During this same time frame, the DoD Inspector General (DoDIG) issued 142 reports 
on deficiencies in the DoD acquisition and contract administration processes. These 
reports have identified poor contract planning, contract administration, and 
contractor oversight as just some of the critically deficient areas in DoD contract 
management.  Because of these deficiencies, the GAO has identified contract 
management as a “high risk” area for the federal government since 1990 and 
continues to identify it as high risk (GAO, 2013). 
As the DoD’s services acquisition continues to increase in scope and dollars, 
the agency must give greater attention to proper acquisition planning, adequate 
requirements definition, sufficient price evaluation, and proper contractor oversight 
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professionals by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD[AT&L], 2010), improving the efficiency of the acquisition of products 
and services is of utmost importance to the DoD. In some ways, the issues affecting 
services acquisition are similar to those affecting the acquisition of physical supplies 
and weapon systems.  However, the unique characteristics of services and the 
increasing importance of services acquisition offer a significant opportunity for 
conducting research in the management of services acquisition in the Department of 
Defense. 
A. Research Questions 
This research project undertakes a focused, in-depth study of the services 
acquisition so as to understand how success of service acquisition contracts is being 
defined and measured in the Navy.  The contract management process is performed 
with inputs from the different functional areas, using a cross-functional team or 
integrated project team (IPT) structure.  The team members represent their 
functional areas such as program management, contracting, financial, logistics, and 
quality assurance.  Each of these project team members represents the 
stakeholders, and their different goals and objectives, as discussed in the previous 
section.  For example, project managers are generally focused on meeting the cost, 
schedule, and performance objectives of the contract.  Yet these objectives could 
possibly be in conflict with the contracting officer’s objectives of protecting the 
government’s interest and ensuring that the contract is in compliance with statutory 
requirements (for example, providing for full and open competition) and public policy 
objectives (for example, supporting small and minority-owned businesses).  In 
addition, the contract’s end user may have contract objectives that are different from 
those of the project manager and contracting officer.  Based on these potentially 
incongruent objectives, each functional area may consider a contract’s success 
differently than the other functional areas.  Hence, the first research question we 
investigated was as follows: How do different stakeholders define successful 
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services acquisition practices, we also investigated the second research question: 
How do different stakeholders measure services contracts within the Navy? 
Investigating the previous two questions helped us develop recommendations 
regarding the third and final research question: How should the service contract’s 
success be measured?  The next section provides a literature review of some of the 
management theories informing service supply chain management, as well as some 
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II. Literature Review 
The academic research in the management of services acquisition is founded 
on several economic and management theories including agency theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1979), contractual 
theory (Luo, 2002), service operations and supply management (Fitzsimmons & 
Fitzsimmons, 2006), and stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Cleland ,1986; El-
Gohary, Osman, & El-Diraby, 2006).  In addition to providing a brief review of the 
agency theory and the stakeholder theory, we also provide a summary of research 
projects carried out by the authors in the area of services supply chain. 
A. Agency Theory  
Agency theory is reflected in a contract between the government and a 
contractor forming a principal–agent relationship. The principal (government) 
contracts with the agent (contractor) to perform some level of effort, such as 
developing or manufacturing a product or providing a service. In this relationship, the 
government’s objectives include obtaining the product or service at the right quality, 
right quantity, right source, right time, and right price (Lee & Dobler, 1971). The 
federal government also has the additional objective of ensuring the product or 
service is procured in accordance with public policy and statutory requirements 
(Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR], 2012).  Contractors, on the other hand, 
pursue the objectives of earning a profit, ensuring company growth, maintaining or 
increasing market share, and improving cash flow, just to name a few. Because of 
the different and conflicting objectives between the principal and agent, each party is 
motivated and incentivized to behave in a certain manner. This behavior includes 
either withholding or sharing information. In principal–agent relationships that involve 
higher levels of uncertainty, which result in higher risk (such as developing an 
advanced technology weapon system), the information available to the government 
and contractor is typically asymmetrical.  Thus, agency theory is concerned with the 
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objectives and is focused on mechanisms related to obtaining information (for 
example, about the marketplace, the supply or service, or the contractor), selecting 
the agent (to counter the problem of adverse selection), and monitoring the agent’s 
performance (to counter the effects of moral hazard). Thus, decisions about how 
contracts are planned (for example, competitive or sole source), structured (fixed 
price or cost reimbursement, with or without incentives), awarded (based on lowest 
priced, technically acceptable offer, or the highest technically rated offer), and 
administered (centralized or decentralized, level and type of surveillance, and use of 
project teams, etc.) have their basis in agency theory and the principal–agent 
problem. Agency theory can also be applied to project management, specifically in 
the management of services acquisition projects (Moe, 1984). In services acquisition 
projects, the same principal–agent model exists. The principal in this perspective is 
the project manager, and the agents are the other members of the project team, for 
example, the contracting officer and financial manager.  The project manager is 
faced with the problem of ensuring the agents, in this context the members of the 
project team, will choose to pursue the principal’s best interests. 
B. Stakeholder Theory  
Stakeholder theory can also be used to analyze DoD services acquisition.  In 
stakeholder theory, the purpose of the organization (for example, a DoD agency) is 
to generate and dispense some form of wealth to various stakeholders (individuals 
that have a stake or interest in the agency), and, in order to achieve that purpose, all 
of the stakeholders cooperate (Freeman, 1984).  Thus, stakeholder theory, as 
applied to DoD services acquisition, includes all of the major stakeholders 
concerned with the services acquisition project including the program/project 
manager (PM), contracting officer (CO), contracting officer representative (COR), 
financial manager, and the customers who use the service.  The program/project 
manager is responsible for ensuring that the desired services acquisition results (in 
terms of cost, schedule, and performance) are achieved.  The contracting officer is 
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terminate contracts and make related determinations and findings (FAR, 2012). The 
contracting officer is responsible for making sure that contracts are planned, 
executed, and closed out in accordance with agency regulations and statutory 
requirements (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  Contracting officers support the PM by 
providing contracting support to help achieve the contract objectives of cost, 
schedule, and performance.  Due to the technical and complex nature of the DoD’s 
acquired services, the contracting officer representative (COR) is an integral 
member of the acquisition team.   The COR is the individual providing technical 
expertise of the service being procured and is formally appointed in writing by the 
contracting officer.  The COR is involved in the entire acquisition and procurement 
process and assists the contracting officer in developing the technical documents 
associated with the procurement.  Thus, the COR supports the PM and CO by 
monitoring all of the day-to-day technical aspects of the contract to include 
inspecting and accepting the services provided by the contractor.  The finance 
manager is another stakeholder in DoD services acquisition, serving as the fiscal 
and budgetary advisor to the program manager.  The finance manager is 
responsible for ensuring compliance with the statutory requirements of fiscal law 
(e.g., that proper authorization is granted for expending funds, the contract 
obligations occur during the time limits prescribed by appropriation, and adequate 
funding is available; Rendon & Snider, 2008).  The customer’s role in the services 
acquisition process is to have sufficient knowledge of the requirement so that it can 
be clearly communicated to industry through the contracting process.  The customer 
plays a vital role in the services acquisition process because this is the stakeholder 
that determines how well the service requirement is documented in the contracting 
process.   Although the PM, CO, COR, financial manager, and customer are all 
important stakeholders of a service acquisition, they each have differing roles and 
responsibilities, and their definitions of success may vary and may even be in 
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C. Services Supply Chain Management 
We have addressed the need for research in this increasingly important area 
of services acquisition by undertaking six sponsored research projects over the past 
six years.  The first two research projects (Apte, Ferrer, Lewis, & Rendon, 2006; 
Apte & Rendon, 2007) were exploratory in nature, aimed at understanding the types 
of services being acquired, the associated rates of growth in services acquisition, 
and the major challenges and opportunities present in the service supply chain .   
The next two research projects were survey-based empirical studies aimed at 
developing a high-level understanding of how services acquisition is currently being 
managed at a wide range of Army, Navy, and Air Force installations (Apte, Apte, & 
Rendon, 2008; Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 2009).  The analysis of survey data indicated 
that the current state of services acquisition management suffers from several 
deficiencies including deficit billet and manning levels (which are further aggravated 
by insufficient training and the inexperience of acquisition personnel), and the lack of 
strong project-team and life-cycle approaches.  Our research (Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 
2010) also analyzed and compared the results of the primary data collected in two 
previous empirical studies involving Army, Navy, and Air Force contracting 
organizations so as to develop a more thorough and comprehensive understanding 
of how services acquisition is being managed within individual military Services.   
As a result of these research projects dealing with the service supply chain in 
the DoD, we have developed a comprehensive, high-level understanding of services 
acquisition in the DoD, have identified several specific deficiencies, and have 
proposed a number of concrete recommendations for performance improvement.    
Based on the foundation of the previously mentioned management theories, 
conclusions of the GAO and DoDIG reports (Seifert & Ermoshkin, 2010), and 
findings of our own sponsored research projects on the topic, we believe that the 
success of service acquisition contracts is significantly influenced by four broadly 
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associated amount of acquisition-related workload; (2) the characteristics of 
contracts being awarded; (3) the capacity available to carry out the contracting, 
project management, and surveillance work; and (4) various management practices 
such as use of project team or life-cycle approaches and so forth.  A conceptual 









Figure 1. Drivers of Acquisition Practices and Success of  
Service Contracts 
As shown in the conceptual diagram of Figure 1, the contract characteristics 
are affected by the type of service being acquired, while the management practices 
being used are influenced by the services being acquired, the contract 
characteristics, and, more importantly, the capacity available to perform the 
acquisition work.  The success of services contracts, in turn, is affected by the 
previously mentioned four drivers. Underlying Figure 1 is the fundamental question 
motivating our in-depth research: what drives the success of services contracts?  
This fundamental question is, of course, critically important, and yet it is also not one 
that can be answered easily or quickly.  We believe that, generally, in the case of 
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system in smaller parts, gain an understanding of the functioning of each part, and 
then put all the pieces together to better understand the overall system and answer 
the fundamental question.   
The objectives of this research project are to (1) understand how the success 
of services contracts is being defined by different stakeholders, (2) identify how the 
success of services contracts is currently being measured, and (3) develop specific 
recommendations on how the success of services contracts should be measured.  
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III. Research Methodology 
With the assistance of our MBA thesis students (Hagan, Spede, & Sutton, 
2012), we developed and deployed a data collection survey instrument to collect 
empirical data for answering our research questions.  The survey was deployed to 
the various stakeholders at the participating commands.  We then analyzed the data 
using descriptive statistics to provide recommendations and conclusions. 
We developed and deployed a web-based survey using the SurveyMonkey 
website.  The survey instrument included both demographic questions and core 
questions related to defining and measuring successful services contracts.  The core 
questions were designed to establish the importance of different factors when 
defining and measuring the success of services contracts.  These core questions 
were related to the contracting process, as well as to different outcomes such as 
cost, schedule, and performance (Hagan, Spede, & Sutton, 2012).   
In terms of defining successful contracts, the core questions asked 
participants to rank various definitions relating to the four metrics (process, cost, 
schedule, and performance) in order of most important (1) to least important (5). We 
also asked participants to rate definition statements relating to process, cost, 
schedule, and performance.  These questions use a Likert scale asking level of 
agreement, importance, and amount of time devoted by the participants.  The Likert 
scale had a range of 1 to 5, with 1 representing a negative response and 5 
representing a positive response (Hagan, Spede, & Sutton, 2012). 
In terms of measuring successful contracts, the core questions asked 
participants to rank various measurements relating to the four metrics in order of 
most important (1) to least important (5). The last question in the section asks 
participants to rate on a Likert scale how often the organization conducts certain 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 12 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
cost, and performance.  Figure 2 reflects our survey question approach (Hagan, 
Spede, & Sutton, 2012).  
 
Figure 2. Diagram of Survey Questions 
The survey was deployed to the major stakeholders (PMs, COs, and CORs) 
at the following major contracting commands: Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) 
Philadelphia, FLC Jacksonville, FLC Norfolk, FLC Puget Sound, FLC San Diego, 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR; Hagan, Spede, & Sutton, 
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IV. Survey Results and Analysis 
In this section, we present the results of the survey and discuss its major 
findings.  As mentioned previously, the primary objective of this research is to 
empirically examine how the success of a service contract is being defined and 
measured by different stakeholders.  We designed a survey containing 19 questions 
and distributed them to the major stakeholders in the services acquisition process to 
receive their responses.  The survey was deployed at eight Navy installations 
identified previously.  We distributed the survey to a total of 843 respondents 
responsible for various acquisition-related functions.  Specifically, we surveyed the 
following stakeholders: program manager/project officer, contract officer/contract 
specialist, contracting officer representative, requirements manager, financial 
manager, contractor, and customer.  The survey questions included both Likert-type 
as well as ranking-type questions.  The Likert-type questions were used to assess 
favorable or unfavorable responses, while the ranking-type questions were used to 
assess the most important responses.   When we examine the ranking questions in 
this section, the term “most important” refers to the number of factors that received 
the highest rankings of 1 or 2.  We believe that this is the best way to capture and 
succinctly represent the participants’ responses.  For example, a COR may feel that 
the outcome-related factors are extremely important and, therefore, should be given 
the highest ranking of 1 every time.  However, the COR may also believe that the 
process-related factors are very important, too, and hence may assign the next 
highest rank of 2 to those factors. Hence, we believe that the percent of respondents 
giving a rank of 1 or 2 to a factor is the most effective way to capture and represent 
the importance of that factor while analyzing the data on ranking of factors. 
The survey response rates we experienced for different categories of 
stakeholders are shown in Table 1.  Unfortunately, we received only a small number 
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customers.  Hence, their responses are not incorporated in this report for analysis 
purposes.  These respondents are combined under the “other” category in Table 1. 








PROGRAM MANAGER/PROJECT OFFICER 94 15 16% 
CONTRACTING OFFICER 
REPRESENTATIVE 104 27 26% 
CONTRACTING OFFICER/ CONTRACT 
SPECIALIST 280 126 45% 
AGGREGATE DATA (PM, COR, PCO)  478 168 35% 
OTHER 365 10 2.7% 
TOTAL  843 178 21% 
We present the survey results and analysis in three sub-sections: the first 
sub-section presents the aggregate data, the second sub-section presents the 
stakeholder-level data, and the third sub-section presents the service-type data.  A 
set of tables summarizing the survey data is presented in Appendix A. 
A. Survey Results: Aggregate Survey Data 
1. Defining the Success of a Service Contract  
In taking a high-level view of our survey findings, we did not differentiate 
between functional roles, DAWIA levels of certification, type of service being 
acquired, contract type, or the organization.  However, we did separate our findings 
under the broad categories of process and outcome.  Outcome results included the 
questions associated with cost, schedule, and performance.  As shown in Table 1, 
collectively, there were 168 responses from PMs, CORs, or PCOs.  The Likert scale 
responses were assigned a value of 1 through 5, with the higher value representing 
a more favorable response to a statement. A summary of aggregate data about 
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and 3 of Appendix A. We examined the mean of responses to each set of Likert 
scale-type questions.  We found that when defining the success of a services 
contract, outcomes are considered slightly more important than processes.  The 
overall mean of responses related to outcomes was 4.08, while process responses 
resulted in a mean of 3.97.  Our findings are displayed graphically in Figure 3. 
We then separated our findings further within the broad category of outcomes 
into the narrower categories of cost, schedule, and performance.  Performance-
related questions resulted in the highest mean of 4.29, while cost-related questions 
produced a mean of 4.03, and schedule-related questions produced a mean of 3.93. 
One hundred and sixty-eight respondents were asked to rank different factors 
related to defining the success of a service contract.  These questions also dealt 
with different aspects of processes and outcomes.  Of the 168 respondents, 40% felt 
that process-related factors were the most important.  Sixty percent felt that 
outcome-related factors were the most important. The distribution of highest ranked 
responses is displayed in Figure 4. 
Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 15% of respondents felt 
that cost-related factors were the most important, 19% felt that schedule-related 
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Figure 3. Means of Aggregate Stakeholder Definitions of Success 
 
Figure 4. Aggregate Stakeholder Ranking of Definitions of Success 
2. Measuring the Success of a Service Contract 
Our survey also requested that participants rate on the Likert scale the 
various degrees of importance, and the extent to which they agreed or disagreed 
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contract.  Again, these factors related to either processes or outcomes.  The overall 
Likert scale mean with relation to processes was 2.48, and the outcomes displayed 
an overall mean of 3.71.  Clearly outcomes are deemed more important by our 
participants as a whole.  Our findings are displayed graphically in Figure 5. 
If we look at the distinct factors within outcome of cost, schedule, and 
performance, the overall Likert means were 3.96, 3.84, and 3.30, respectively. 
One hundred and sixty-eight respondents were asked to rank different factors 
related to measuring the success of a service contract.  Of the 168 respondents, 
46% felt that process-related factors were the most important.  Fifty-four percent felt 
that outcome-related factors were the most important. The distribution of highest 
ranked responses is displayed in Figure 6. 
 Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 19% of respondents felt 
that cost-related factors were the most important, 12% felt that schedule-related 
factors were most important, and 23% felt that performance-related factors were 
most important.  
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Figure 6. Aggregate Stakeholder Ranking of Measurements  
of Success 
3. Analysis of Aggregate Survey Data 
The findings from the analysis of aggregate survey data show that when 
asked to respond on a Likert scale, different stakeholders find all aspects of 
processes and outcomes important when defining the success of a service contract.  
The means of the responses we collected are very close, and it does not seem that, 
as a whole, our population favors process or outcome when defining success.  
Perhaps this is due to the nature of Likert scale questions.  When asked if something 
such as cost overruns, major milestones, or a lack of protests is important, all 
stakeholders will invariably say yes.  That is why the overall mean of all responses, 
for both outcomes and processes, is fairly high at 4.03.  When forced to rank, the 
responses differ and outcome-related responses received a high rank of 1 or 2 60% 
of the time.  This is because outcomes such as keeping on schedule and budget 
adherence are easy to understand and define.  Process-related factors such as 
administration and communication are relatively harder to quantify. 
The findings also demonstrate that when measuring the success of a service 
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consideration the processes; this was true for both Likert scale responses and 
ranking responses.  This is very evident in the Likert scale responses, where none of 
the process-related factors showed a mean of 3 or more.  When forced to rank the 
different factors with respect to measuring success, the results were similar to 
defining success, with 56% of “most important” responses falling under the 
outcomes category. 
In general our findings from the “other” category mirrored our aggregate 
results.  While there were only 10 responses, all felt that outcomes were the most 
important factor when defining and measuring the success of a service contract.  We 
found that our stakeholders in this category rated and ranked processes extremely 
low in both defining and measuring the success of a service contract.  This is 
because these stakeholders are not terribly burdened by administration and other 
process-related factors so they feel that these factors are not important.  For 
example, a contractor or end user does not necessarily conduct market research or 
choose the appropriate contract type.  However, they are very concerned with 
staying within cost, keeping up with schedule, and maintaining a high level of 
performance. 
B. Survey Results: Stakeholder-Level Data  
As a starting point in examining how different stakeholders define and 
measure the success of a service contract, we performed a statistical analysis of the 
data to determine if there were significant differences between the ratings on the 
Likert scale across the major stakeholders.  We first performed an F-test for sample 
variances to determine the appropriate t-test to perform.  In all instances, we found 
that there was an equal variance among stakeholders.  The only statistically 
significant difference was between the CORs and CO/specialists when measuring 
success.  This could be due to the fact that CORs view communication and other 
processes as a key factor when measuring the success of a service contract.  The 
COR is also likely to view a protest as a serious issue when measuring success 
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Otherwise, there was no statistically significant difference between any other of the 
stakeholders on the Likert scale.  Given these results, we do not plan to present 
charts presenting and comparing how different stakeholders define and measure 
success of a service contract. However, a summary of how different stakeholders 
define and measure the success of a service contract is presented in Tables 4 and 5 
of Appendix A.   We discuss in the next section the results of the analysis of 
stakeholder-level data. 
1. Analysis of Stakeholder-Level Data 
Consistent with the abovementioned results of statistical analysis, we found 
that PMs, CORs, COs, and contract specialists all agree that outcome is slightly 
more important than processes, based on participants’ ratings of separate factors on 
a Likert scale.  Each functional role rated outcome slightly over 4.00, while rating 
processes just below 4.00.  The mean of the functional roles combined was 3.94 for 
processes, and 4.11 for outcomes.  Within outcome, performance-related factors 
received the highest average rating, while schedule-related factors received the 
lowest average rating.  All functional roles showed an upward trend from schedule, 
to cost, to performance.  A comparison of our Likert scale findings for defining 
success across functional roles is displayed graphically in Figure 7. 
When stakeholders were asked to rank different factors concerning their 
definition of success, we found that there was clear agreement that outcomes are 
more important than processes.  There was, however, some disagreement within the 
outcome factors of cost, schedule, and performance. CORs felt that cost was the 
most important factor, while PMs, COs, and specialists placed performance at the 
top of their rankings.  Examined collectively, the major stakeholders provided 168 
responses when ranking their definition of the success of a service contract.  Sixty 
percent of respondents felt that outcome-related factors were most important, while 
40% felt that process-related factors were the most important when defining 
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Figure 7. Definitions of Success Across Major Stakeholders 
 
Figure 8. Major Stakeholder Ranking of Definitions of Success 
According to the survey data, stakeholders also tend to measure success in 
almost the same way.  When asked to rate different factors on the Likert scale 
related to stakeholders’ measures of success, all respondents agreed that outcomes 
far outweigh processes.  When looking at the mean across stakeholders, processes 
received a rating of 2.56, while outcomes received a rating of 3.78.  Within outcome-
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schedule, to cost.  A comparison of our findings for defining success on the Likert 
scale across functional roles is displayed graphically in Figure 9. 
Our ranking data shows that, again, major stakeholders prefer outcome-
related factors when measuring the success of service contracts.  When examined 
in aggregate, the major stakeholders provided 168 responses to our ranking 
questions.  Of these responses, 43% of respondents felt process factors were most 
important, while 57% were in favor of factors related to outcomes.  The distribution 
of highest ranked responses is displayed in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. Major Stakeholder Ranking of Measurements  
of Success 
The Likert scale responses for definitions of success were, again, relatively 
high, and this was due to the reason explained earlier.  It is interesting that in both 
defining and measuring success, CORs ranked cost highest out of the three 
stakeholders. 
Another interesting result is that COs tended to place nearly equal importance 
on process and outcomes when forced to rank factors concerning measuring 
success.  This is probably due to the administrative nature of the COs’ role.  For 
example, their functional role has to deal with modifications, COR reports, and 
exercising options.  The other functional roles of PMs and CORs are not overly 
concerned with processes and are focused on the requirement and outcomes.  The 
data reflect this fact. 
It is interesting to note that every demographic consistently rated processes 
significantly higher on the Likert scale when defining success versus measuring 
success.  We feel that this is because stakeholders view measures as a tangible 
entity associated with post-award functions.  Measures such as cost, schedule, and 
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Processes such as communication flow and overall management are more obscure 
and subjective.  The stakeholders rated processes higher for defining success 
because they are closely associated with mainly pre-award functions.  Processes 
such as choosing the correct contract type and appropriately evaluating the proposal 
are crucial for success.  Because these are pre-award activities, it is easier to define 
success rather than measure it. 
C. Survey Results: Type of Service 
While examining our data, we found that the majority of responses were from 
participants who procured two types of services. Of the 168 total responses, the 
equipment-related service portfolio grouping accounted for 72 responses and the 
knowledge-based service portfolio grouping for 77 responses.  The equipment-
related service portfolio grouping includes the procurement of maintenance, repair 
and overhaul, equipment modification, installation, and quality control.  The 
knowledge-based services portfolio grouping is composed of professional and 
administrative services, engineering management, program management, logistics 
management, and education and training.  Given that the majority of responses were 
from these two groups, we examined and compared how stakeholders involved with 
equipment-related services and knowledge-based services, respectively, define and 
measure success of services contracts.  We only differentiated by type of service 
and made no other demographic distinctions for mean and ranking results. A 
summary of survey data regarding how stakeholders acquiring these two services 
define and measure the success of a service contract is presented in Tables 6 and 7 
of Appendix A.    
An analysis of responses showed that 40% of knowledge-based service 
participants were involved with cost reimbursement-type contracts as compared to 
only 6% for equipment-related services. The higher percentage of cost 
reimbursement-type contracts for knowledge-based service participants is most 
likely due to the increased challenges and uncertainties in defining requirements 
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more concrete in terms of requirements definition and would be more suitable for a 
fixed-price contractual instrument. 
1. Defining the Success of a Service Contract 
In response to our questions asking participants to classify different factors 
related to defining the success of a service contract, we received 149 responses 
from participants who work on knowledge-based and equipment-related services. 
When differentiating between types of service, we found that equipment-related 
service participants rated both processes and outcomes higher on all Likert scale 
questions than knowledge-based service participants.  Equipment-related 
participants displayed a mean rating on process and outcome factors of 4.05 and 
4.10, respectively.  Knowledge-based participants displayed a mean rating on 
process and outcome factors of 3.92 and 4.02, respectively.  This shows that 
participants segregated by type of service may rate processes and outcomes slightly 
differently; however, they both indicated that outcomes are slightly more important 
than processes for defining success.  Our results are displayed graphically by type 
of service in Figure 11. 
The respondents were also asked to rank definitions of success concerning a 
service contract.  The questions asked dealt with different aspects of defining 
success—some were related to process while others were related to outcome. Of 
the 72 respondents involved with procurement of equipment-related services, 42% 
believe that process factors are most important, while 58% felt that outcomes more 
accurately define the success of a service contract.  Breaking down the outcome-
related factors further, 15% felt that cost-related factors were the most important, 
18% felt that schedule-related factors were most important, and 25% felt that 
performance-related factors were most important. 
Seventy-seven respondents involved with knowledge-based services 
provided responses when asked to rank definitions of success concerning a service 
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important, while 61% felt that outcomes more accurately defined the success of a 
service contract.  The results show that equipment-related service participants rated 
processes higher and outcomes lower than knowledge-based participants, but they 
both indicated that outcomes are more important than processes for defining 
success, based on their responses to ranking questions.  The distribution of highest 
ranked responses is displayed in Figure 12. Breaking down the outcome-related 
factors further, 16% felt that cost-related factors were the most important, 18% felt 
that schedule-related factors were most important, and 28% felt that performance-
related factors were most important. 
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Figure 12. Ranking of Definitions of Success by Service Type 
2. Measuring the Success of a Service Contract 
In measuring the success for different types of services, the equipment-
related service participants rated processes much higher on Likert scale questions 
than knowledge-based service participants.  Equipment-related service participants 
also rated outcomes as being of lower importance than did knowledge-based service 
participants.  Equipment-related participants displayed a mean rating on process 
and outcome factors of 2.68 and 3.76, respectively.  Knowledge-based participants 
displayed a mean rating on process and outcome factors of 2.29 and 3.82, 
respectively.  The results show that equipment-related service participants rated 
processes higher and outcomes lower than knowledge-based participants, but they 
both indicated that outcomes are more important than processes for measuring 
success, based on their responses to Likert scale questions.  Our results are 
displayed graphically by type of service in Figure 13. 
Of the 72 respondents involved with equipment-related services, process-
related factors were ranked most important 44% of the time, while outcome-related 
factors were ranked as most important 56% of the time.  Breaking down the 
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were the most important, 12% felt that schedule-related factors were most important, 
and 21% felt that performance-related factors were most important. 
Forty-eight percent of the 77 respondents associated with knowledge-based 
services felt that process-related factors were the most important when measuring 
success.  Fifty-two percent of respondents felt that outcome-related factors were the 
most important.  The results show that equipment-related service participants rated 
processes lower and outcomes higher than did knowledge-based participants, but 
they both indicated that outcomes are more important than processes for measuring 
success, based on their responses to our ranking questions.  The distribution of 
highest ranked responses is displayed in Figure 14.  Breaking down the outcome-
related factors further, 16% of respondents felt that cost-related factors were the 
most important, 11% felt that schedule-related factors were most important, and 
25% felt that performance-related factors were most important. 
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Figure 14. Ranking of Measurement of Success by Service Type 
3. Analysis of Service-Type Data 
The findings based on type of service showed no substantial deviation for 
defining the success of a services contract.  Both equipment-related and knowledge-
based groups rated outcomes slightly higher than processes, based on their 
responses to the Likert scale questions.  Ranking questions for definitions of 
success showed outcomes as more important than processes for both groups and 
corroborated the Likert scale mean findings.  Both Likert scale and ranking question 
results show performance to be the most important component of outcomes. For 
example, performance had means of 4.28 and 4.24, compared to 3.97 and 3.82 for 
schedule.  In their responses to the ranking questions, 25-28% of respondents in 
both groups ranked performance-related factors highest, while 18% ranked 
schedule-related factors highest.  Perhaps ranking results, due to the limitation of 
choices, provide the most precise definitions of success.  When participants were 
forced to rank, they emphasized the importance of outcomes (cost, schedule, and 
performance) over processes more definitively when defining characteristics of 
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The findings for measuring success also showed no substantial deviation 
based on type of service.  Both equipment-related and knowledge-based groups 
rated outcomes significantly higher than processes on the Likert scale questions.  
Ranking questions for measuring success showed outcomes as more important than 
processes for both groups and corroborated the Likert scale mean findings.  
Participants who work on equipment-related services rated cost as more important 
and performance as less important on both Likert and ranking questions compared 
to knowledge-based participants.  This finding seems to indicate that for knowledge-
based services, stakeholders were more willing to trade cost for enhanced 
performance.  This may be attributable to the highly specialized and technical nature 
of functions such as engineering management and program management, which the 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 31 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
V. Summary, Conclusions, and 
Recommendations 
A. Summary 
The DoD’s obligations on contracts have more than doubled between fiscal 
years 2001 and 2008 to over $387 billion, with over $200 billion spent just for 
services in 2008 (GAO, 2009). In conjunction with this increase in defense 
procurement is the reduction of the defense acquisition workforce.  The combination 
of the increasing defense procurement workload and the decreasing size of the 
government workforce, along with the complexities of an arcane and convoluted 
government contracting process, have created the perfect storm—an environment in 
which complying with government contracting policies and adopting contract 
management best practices has not always been feasible (Rendon, 2010).  The 
contract management process is performed with inputs from the different functional 
areas, using a cross-functional team or integrated project team (IPT) structure.  The 
team members represent their functional areas such as program management, 
contracting, financial, logistics, and quality assurance.  Each of these project team 
members represents the stakeholders, and their different goals and objectives.  The 
first research question we investigated was as follows: How do different 
stakeholders define successful services contracts within the Navy?  To develop a 
clear understanding of current services acquisition practices, we also investigated a 
second research question: How do different stakeholders measure services 
contracts within the Navy? Investigating the above two questions helped us develop 
recommendations regarding the third and final research question: How should the 
service contract’s success be measured? 
B. Conclusions 
On the aggregate level, our research indicated that, when defining a 
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performance, cost, and schedule) slightly more important than processes.  
Stakeholders also ranked outcome-related factors as most important.  On the 
aggregate, our research indicated that, when measuring a successful service 
contract, stakeholders considered outcomes (in the order of cost, schedule, and 
performance) more important than processes.  Stakeholders also ranked outcome-
related factors as most important.   
On the stakeholder level, our research indicated that, when defining a 
successful service contract, PMs, CORs, and COs considered outcomes (in the 
order of performance, cost, and schedule) slightly more important than processes.  
PMs, CORs, and COs also ranked outcome-related factors as most important.  On 
the stakeholder level, our research indicated that, when measuring a successful 
service contract, PMs, CORs, and COs considered outcomes (in the order of 
performance, schedule, and cost) more important than processes.  PMs, CORs, and 
COs also ranked outcome-related factors as most important.   
On the equipment-related service type, our research indicated that, when 
defining a successful service contract, stakeholders considered outcomes (in the 
order of performance, schedule, and cost) slightly more important than processes.  
Stakeholders also ranked outcome-related factors as most important.  On the 
equipment-related service type, our research indicated that, when measuring a 
successful service contract, stakeholders considered outcomes (in the order of cost, 
performance, and schedule) more important than processes.  Stakeholders also 
ranked outcome-related factors as most important.   
On the knowledge-based service type, our research indicated that, when 
defining a successful service contract, stakeholders considered outcomes (in the 
order of performance, schedule, and cost) slightly more important than processes.  
Stakeholders also ranked outcome-related factors as most important.  On the 
knowledge-based service type, our research indicated that, when measuring a 
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performance, cost, and schedule) more important than processes.  Stakeholders 
also ranked outcome-related factors as most important.   
C. Recommendations 
Our research findings have several implications for the Navy, as well as the 
DoD.  All stakeholders surveyed identified and ranked outcome-related factors as 
more important than process-related factors, in both defining and measuring the 
success of service contracts.  This may be because outcome-related factors (cost, 
schedule, and performance) are more easily defined and measured using available 
metrics, compared to contracting processes, which are more difficult to define and 
many agencies have no available metrics.  However, as discussed in the earlier 
sections of this paper, many of the contracting deficiencies identified by the GAO 
and DoDIG are related to contracting processes, such as conducting market 
research, determining item commerciality, selecting contract type, negotiating fair 
and reasonable prices, and monitoring contractors through surveillance. Thus, our 
first recommendation is that the U.S. Navy should develop and implement process-
related metrics to define and measure critical contracting processes, such as 
conducting market research, determining item commerciality, selecting contract type, 
negotiating fair and reasonable prices, and monitoring contractors.   
Our literature review identified that acquisition stakeholders (PMs, CORs, and 
COs) have different procurement goals and objectives, and these goals and 
objectives may in fact conflict with each other. Our second recommendation is that 
the U.S. Navy should establish internal controls to ensure the contracting processes 
are being followed and that the different stakeholders place sufficient importance on 
the value of these contracting processes.   
Finally, as previous research has determined that contracts are only as 
successful as the processes used to plan, award, and administer these contracts, 
our final recommendation is for the U.S. Navy to implement a program for 
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results to improve its organizational contract management process capability.   Once 
the U.S. Navy, as well as the DoD, implement contracting process-related metrics to 
define and measure services contracts, internal controls to ensure contracting 
process compliance, and periodical assessments of organizational contracting 
process capability, the importance of process-related factors in defining and 
measuring the success of service contracts will increase among stakeholders and 
thus start addressing some of the contracting deficiencies identified by the GAO and 
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Appendix A. Tables of Survey Results 
Table 2. Aggregate Stakeholders Means With Distributions 
Aggregate 
Stakeholders  
Define  Measure 
Likert 
Mean  
1 2 3 4 5 
Likert 
Mean 1 2 3 4 5 







2.47 85 83 57 44 26 
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Table 3. Aggregate Stakeholders Highest Ranking % 
Aggregate 
Stakeholders  
Define  Measure 
Highest Rank % Highest Rank % 
Process  40% 46% 
Outcome  60% 54% 
   Cost  15% 19% 
   Schedule  19% 12% 
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Table 4. Stakeholder Means With Distributions 
Stakeholders  Define Measure 
Likert 
Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 
Likert 
Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 
PM 
Process  3.87 1 11 11 30 30 2.52 4 8 8 4 1 
Outcome  4.13 0 4 10 40 39 3.78 8 8 21 25 18 
   Cost  4.24 0 0 3 15 9 4.15 0 0 1 10 3 
   Schedule  3.63 0 4 6 9 7 3.92 0 1 2 8 3 
   
Performance  
4.51 0 0 1 16 23 3.25 8 7 18 7 12 
COR 
Process  3.97 8 12 19 55 62 2.76 6 15 7 11 3 
Outcome  4.15 0 9 15 52 68 3.77 10 22 39 49 23 
   Cost  4.16 0 3 5 23 19 4.23 0 0 3 11 8 
   Schedule  4.06 0 4 8 21 19 4.08 0 1 2 16 6 
   
Performance  
4.23 0 2 2 8 30 2.99 10 21 34 22 9 
CO 
Process  3.97 22 75 112 239 307 2.41 71 56 40 28 21 
Outcome  4.06 7 43 122 390 305 3.81 28 82 149 271 153 
   Cost  3.98 3 16 40 106 76 3.98 0 3 23 63 27 
   Schedule  3.91 2 20 39 127 63 3.98 1 3 19 67 26 
   
Performance  
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Table 5. Stakeholders Highest Ranking % 
Stakeholders  Define  Measure 
Highest Rank % Highest Rank % 
PM 
Process  41% 43% 
Outcome  59% 57% 
   Cost  11% 13% 
   Schedule  22% 14% 
   Performance  27% 30% 
COR 
Process  39% 39% 
Outcome  61% 61% 
   Cost  17% 28% 
   Schedule  19% 9% 
   Performance  24% 24% 
CO  
Process  40% 49% 
Outcome  60% 51% 
   Cost  15% 17% 
   Schedule  17% 12% 
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Table 6. Service Type Means With Distributions 
Service 
Type    
Define  Measure 
Likert 
Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 
Likert 
Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 
Equipment Related 
Process  4.05 7 25 69 147 159 2.68 27 25 23 17 14 
Outcome  4.10 2 13 70 221 160 3.76 17 44 94 143 72 
   Cost  4.03 1 5 21 64 39 4.08 0 0 12 39 17 
   Schedule  3.97 0 6 25 70 33 3.87 0 2 14 39 10 
   
Performance  
4.28 1 2 24 87 88 3.34 17 42 68 65 45 
Knowledge Based   
Process  3.92 15 59 52 138 179 2.29 43 37 20 19 7 
Outcome  4.02 6 38 60 223 180 3.82 20 46 88 155 88 
   Cost  4.00 1 11 19 65 45 3.97 0 2 12 39 14 
   Schedule  3.82 2 21 20 63 41 4.07 1 2 8 37 20 
   
Performance  
4.24 3 6 21 95 94 3.41 19 42 68 79 54 
Table 7. Service Type Highest Rank % 
Service Type    Define  Measure 
Highest Rank % Highest Rank % 
Equipment Related 
Process  42% 44% 
Outcome  58% 56% 
   Cost  15% 21% 
   Schedule  18% 13% 
   Performance  25% 22% 
Knowledge Based   
Process  39% 48% 
Outcome  61% 52% 
   Cost  16% 16% 
   Schedule  18% 11% 
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